History has taught one stubborn lesson: the page that ends the fighting is not the same as the page that ends the cause of fighting. Armistices, accords, and checklists have a moral gloss; they are instruments of mercy. Yet mercy without clarity can harden into reprieve without resolution. When peace is sought as a hurried convenience, rather than a work of national and moral reconstruction, it often proves to be only a thinner veil over the same old conflict.
The twentieth century offers multiple cautionary examples. In 1953, the Korean Peninsula was ordered into an armistice that froze a war rather than ending it; the border became a line of perpetual tension. In 1973, the Paris Accords ceased certain hostilities in Vietnam, but did not settle the political project driving the conflict; the war’s broader effects endured. In 1995, Dayton ended open battle in Bosnia, yet the uneasy…




