[Darwinian Fairytales: Selfish Genes, Errors of Heredity, and Other Fables of Evolution by David Stove (Encounter Books, 1995; xv + 345 pp.)]
In a number of recent columns, I’ve been concerned about whether an evolutionary argument based on natural selection undermines objective ethics. If the best explanation for our moral beliefs is that they are adaptations that were best fitted to help us survive, why isn’t this enough? Why do we need to add that these beliefs are also objectively true? Indeed, the philosopher Sharon Street argues that it would be extraordinarily lucky if the beliefs that natural selection implanted in us turned out to coincide with the objective truths. Isn’t it then rational to drop these allegedly objective truths altogether?
How should those who accept objective truth in ethics respond to the evolutionary argument? Robert Nozick, as I discussed in an earlier…




